Abstract. Building on a previous important work of Cachin, Crépeau, and Marcil [15], we present a provably secure and more efficient protocol for 2 1 -Oblivious Transfer with a storage-bounded receiver. A public random string of n bits long is employed, and the protocol is secure against any receiver who can store γn bits, γ < 1. Our work improves the work of CCM [15] in two ways. First, the CCM protocol requires the sender and receiver to store O(n c ) bits, c ∼ 2/3. We give a similar but more efficient protocol that just requires the sender and receiver to store O( √ kn) bits, where k is a security parameter. Second, the basic CCM Protocol was proved in [15] to guarantee that a dishonest receiver who can store O(n) bits succeeds with probability at most O(n −d ), d ∼ 1/3, although repitition of the protocol can make this probability of cheating exponentially small [20] . Combining the methodologies of [24] and [15] , we prove that in our protocol, a dishonest storage-bounded receiver succeeds with probability only 2 −O(k) , without repitition of the protocol. Our results answer an open problem raised by CCM in the affirmative.
Introduction
Oblivious Transfer (OT) was introduced by Rabin [47] in 1981, and has since then become one of the most fundamental and powerful tools in cryptography. An important generalization, known as one-out-of-two oblivious transfer and denoted 2 1 -OT, was introduced by Even, Goldreich, and Lempel [28] in 1982. Informally speaking, in a 2 1 -OT, a sender Alice has two secret bits M 0 , M 1 ∈ {0, 1}, and a receiver Bob has a secret bit δ ∈ {0, 1}. Alice sends M 0 , M 1 in such a way that Bob receives M δ , but does not learn both M 0 and M 1 , and Alice learns nothing about δ. Crépeau proved in 1987 that OT and 2 1 -OT are equivalent [19] . In 1988, Kilian proved that every secure two-party and multiparty computation can be reduced to OT [33] .
Traditionally, protocols for OT have been based on unproven complexity assumptions that certains problems, such as integer factorization, are computationally hard, or that trapdoor permutations exist. The solutions so obtained, although significant, have a drawback. Namely, they do not guarantee everlasting security. A dishonest player can store the entire conversation during the protocol, and attempt to subvert the security of the protocol later, when enabled by breakthroughs in computing technology and/or code-breaking algorithms. While Our Results. Building on the work of Cachin, Crépeau, and Marcil [15] , we give a similar but more efficient protocol for 2 1 -OT in the bounded storage model. The major difference between our protocol and the CCM Protocol is that the CCM Protocol uses an extra distillation step, which involves many bits divided into polynomially large blocks, and the extraction of a nearly random bit from each block. Getting rid of this distillation step, we reduce the storage requirement to O( √ kn), where k is a security parameter. Combining the methodologies of [24] and [15] , we prove that in our protocol, any dishonest receiver who stores O(n) bits succeeds with probability at most 2 −O(k) , without repetition of the protocol. Our results answer positively an open problem raised in [15] .
Related Work
OT and 2 1 -OT were introduced by Rabin [47] and Even et al [28] respectively. Their equivalence was established by Crépeau [19] . There is a vast literature on the relationships between OT and other cryptographic primitives, and between OT variants. OT can be used to construct protocols for secret key agreement [47] , [8] , [52] , contract signing [28] , bit commitment and zero-knowledge proof [33] , and general secure multi-party computation [52] , [30] , [31] , [33] , [32] , [35] , [36] , [22] . It was proved by Kilian that every secure two-party and multi-party computation reduces to OT [33] . Information-theoretic reductions between OT variants were studied in [10] , [11] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [12] , [9] , [14] , [25] .
In traditional cryptography, protocols for OT have been designed under the assumptions that factoring is hard [47] , discret log is hard [6] , and trapdoor permutations exist [28] , [52] , [30] , [31] . OT has also been studied in the quantum model [7] , and the noisy channel model [20] . Recently OT has been extended to various distributed and concurrent settings [5] , [49] , [29] , [44] , and these protocols are either based on complexity assumption, or information-theoretically secure using private channels and auxilliary servers. Cachin, Crépeau, and Marcil [15] gave the first secure two-party protocol for 2 1 -OT in the bounded storage and public random string model, without any complexity assumption, and without private channels or auxilliary servers.
The public random string model was introduced by Rabin [48] . The bounded storage model was introduced by Maurer [37] . Secure encryption in the bounded storage model was first studied in [37] , [16] , but later significantly stronger results appeared in [1] , [2] , [24] . Information-theoretically secure key agreement was investigated in [38] , [39] , [16] , [40] , [41] , [42] .
The bounded space model for zero-knowledge proof was studied in [18] , [17] , [34] , [23] , [26] , [27] , [3] . Pseudorandomness in the bounded space model was studied in [45] , [46] . However, note the important difference between the bounded space model and the bounded storage model: the bounded space model imposes a bound on the computation space of the adversary, whereas in the bounded storage model the adversary can compute an function with arbitrarily high complexity, provided that the length of the output is bounded.
Preliminaries
This section provides the building blocks for our protocol and analysis. Throughout the paper, k is a security parameter, n is the length of a public random string, and B = γn, γ < 1, is the storage bound on the receiver Bob. For simplicity and WLOG, we consider B = n/6 (i.e. γ = 1/6). Similar results hold for any γ < 1.
, where ⊕ denotes XOR, and α[σ i ] is the σ i -th bit of α.
Thus, if s is good for H, then {s(α) : α ∈ H} is well balanced between 0's and 1's.
The following Lemma 1 says that if H is fat, then almost all s ∈ K are good for H. The lemma follows directly from Main Lemma 1 of [24] , by considering k-tuples in [n] k with distinct coordinates.
If H is fat, and k < √ n 1 , then
In Appendix A we will give a proof lemma 1 from Main Lemma 1 of [24] .
Notation: Let F be a finite set. The notation x R ←− F denotes choosing x uniformly from F . Lemma 2. Let 0 < γ, ν < 1 and ν < 1 − γ. For any function f : {0,
γn . Let µ = 1 − γ − ν. We now bound the number of α ∈ {0, 1} n s.t. f −1 (f (α)) < 2 µn . Since there are at most 2 γn j's such that
Proof. Let γ = 1/6 and ν = 0.02 in Lemma 2.
The rest of this section is devoted to the crucial tools employed by the CCM Protocol and our protocol. We now wish to bound the probability that |A ∩ B| deviates from the expectation. Note that standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds do not directly apply, since elements of the subsets A and B are chosen without replacement. We use the following version of Chernoff-Hoeffding from [4] .
Lemma 4.
[4] Let Z 1 , . . . , Z u be Bernoulli trials (not necessarily independent), and let 0
Proof. Let u = 2 √ kn. Consider any fixed u-subset B ⊂ [n], and a randomly chosen u-subset A = {A 1 , . . . , A u } ⊂ [n]. For i = 1, . . . , u, let Z i be the Bernoulli trial such that Z i = 1 if and only if A i ∈ B. Then clearly
Therefore, (5) follows from (4) and (7), with δ = 1/2.
Interactive Hashing
Interactive Hashing is a protocol introduced by M. Noar, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan, and Yung in the context of bit commitment and zero-knowledge proof [43] . Cachin, Crépeau, and Marcil [15] gave a new elegant analysis of interactive hashing. The protocol involves two parties, Alice and Bob. Bob has a secret tbit string χ ∈ T ⊂ {0, 1} t , where |T | ≤ 2 t−k and T is unknown to Alice. The protocol is defined to be correct and secure if 1. Bob sends χ in such a way that Alice receives two strings χ 0 , χ 1 ∈ {0, 1} t , one of which is χ, but Alice does not know which one is χ. 2. Bob cannot force both χ 0 and χ 1 to be in T .
The following interactive hashing protocol is due to [43] . The same idea involving taking inner products over GF (2), was first introduced by Valiant and V. Vazirani earlier in the complexity of UNIQUE SATISFIABILITY [51] .
NOVY Protocol: Alice randomly chooses t − 1 linearly independent vectors a 1 , . . . , a t−1 ∈ {0, 1} t . The protocol then proceeds in t − 1 rounds. In Round i, for each i = 1, . . . , t − 1, 1. Alice sends a i to Bob. 2. Bob computes b i = a i · χ, where · denotes inner product, and sends b i to Alice.
After the t − 1 rounds, both Alice and Bob have the same system of linear equations a i · x = b i over GF (2) . Since the vectors a 1 , . . . , a t−1 ∈ {0, 1} t are linearly independent, the system of t − 1 linear equations over GF (2) with t unknowns has exactly two solutions, one of which is χ. Therefore, by solving the systems of equations a i · x = b i , Alice receives two strings χ 0 , χ 1 , one of which is χ. It is clear that information-theoretically, Alice does not know which solution is χ. Thus Condition 1 of interactive hashing is satisfied.
The following important lemma, regarding Condition 2 of interactive hashing, was proved in [15] . The same result in a non-adversarial setting, more precisely in the case that the Bob is honest, was proved in [51] .
Lemma 5. [15]
Suppose Alice and Bob engage in interactive hashing of a t-bit string, lg t ≤ k ≤ t, by the NOVY protocol. Let T ⊂ {0, 1} t be any subset with |T | ≤ 2 t−k . Then the probability that Bob can answer Alice's queries in such a way that T contains both strings χ 0 , χ 1 received by Alice, is at most 2 −O(k) .
Corollary 4. Let Alice and Bob engage in interactive hashing of a t-bit string as above. Let T 0 , T 1 ⊂ {0, 1} t be any two subsets with |T 0 |, |T 1 | ≤ 2 t−k . Then the probability that Bob can answer Alice's queries in such a way that either
Proof. Let T = T 0 ∪ T 1 in Lemma 5.
3 Protocol for 1. Bob receives M δ . 2. Bob learns nothing about M 1⊕δ , except with a small probability ν(k), where k is a security parameter. 3. Alice learns nothing about δ.
Outline of Basic Ideas
We first outline the basic ideas underling our protocol for Next, Bob encodes a random k-subset s ⊂ A ∩ B as a lg u k -bit string, and sends s to Alice via the NOVY interactive hashing protocol. By the end of interactive hashing, Alice and Bob will have created two "keys", a good key S G = s, and a bad key S B , each a k-subset of A, such that: Bob knows S G (α), but learns nothing about S B (α), and Alice knows both S G (α) and S B (α), but does not know which key is good and which key is bad.
Once the keys S G and S B are created, the rest of the protocol is trivial. If Bob wants to read M δ , then he simply asks Alice to encrypt M δ with the good key S G , and M 1⊕δ with the good key S B , i.e. Bob ask Alice to send M δ ⊕ S G (δ) and M 1⊕δ ⊕ S B (δ). The correctness and security of the protocol follow from the properties of S B and S G described above.
The Protocol, and Main Results

Notation: For a bit
Notation: From now on, let u = 2 √ kn.
Our protocol for 2 1 -OT, Protocol A, is described below. Protocol A uses two public random strings α 0 , α 1
n . In each of Steps 2 and 3, Alice and Bob each store u = 2 √ kn bits. In the interactive hashing of Step 4, Alice transmits and Bob stores t 2 bits, where t = lg u k < k · (lg u − lg k/e). Since k << n, the storage requirement is dominated by O(u) = O( √ kn).
Protocol A: , and X 1 = s 1 (α 1 ). Alice then computes C 0 = X τ ⊕ M 0 , and C 1 = X τ ⊕ M 1 , and sends C 0 , C 1 to Bob.
Alice randomly chooses
A (0) = A (0) 1 , . . . , A (0) u , A (1) = A (1) 1 , . . . , A (1) u ⊂ [n], with |A (0) | = |A (1) | = u. Bob also chooses random B (0) = B (0) 1 , . . . , B (0) u , B (1) = B (1) 1 , . . . , B (1) u ⊂ [n], with |B (0) | = |B (1) | = u.
Bob reads
(Note that an honest Bob following the protocol has stored α c [A
(1) , as described in Protocol A, consists of u independently chosen elements of [n], resulting in u lg n bits each. However, as noted in [15] , we can reduce the number of bits for describing the sets to O(k log n), by choosing the elements with O(k)-wise independence, without significantly affecting the results.
Lemma 6. The probability that an honest receiver Bob aborts in Step 4 of the protocol, is at most e −k/4 .
Proof. By Corollary 3, Pr
The following two lemmas about Protocol A are immediate.
Lemma 7. The receiver Bob can read M δ simply by following the protocol.
Lemma 8. The sender Alice learns nothing about δ.
Proof. Because Alice does not learn c (defined in Step 4) and b (defined in Step 5) in Protocol A.
Therefore, Conditions 1 and 2 for a correct and secure 2 1 -OT, are satisfied. We now come to the most challenging part, namely, Condition 3 regarding the security against a dishonest receiver Bob, who can store B = n/6 bits, and whose goal is to learn both M 0 and M 1 . While α 0 is broadcast in Step 2, Bob computes an arbitrary function η 0 = A 0 (α 0 ) using unlimited computing power, provided that |η 0 | = n/6; and while α 1 is broadcast in Step 3, Bob computes an arbitrary function η 1 = A 1 (η 0 , α 1 ), |η 1 | = n/6. In Steps 4 -6, using η 1 and n −→ {0, 1} n/6 and A 1 : {0, 1} n/6 ×{0, 1} n −→ {0, 1} n/6 , for any strategy Bob employs in Steps 4 -6 of Protocol A, with probability at least
where
0 (α 0 ), I denotes all the information Bob obtains in Steps 4 -6, and X 0 , X 1 are defined in Step 7 of Protocol A. Theorem 1 says that using all the information he has in his bounded storage, Bob is not able to distinguish between (X β , X β ) and (X β , 1 ⊕ X β ), for some β ∈ {0, 1}, where X 0 , X 1 are defined in Step 7 of Protocol A. From Theorem 1, we obtain:
n −→ {0, 1} n/6 and A 1 : {0, 1} n/6 ×{0, 1} n −→ {0, 1} n/6 , for any strategy Bob employs in Steps 4 -6 of Protocol A, with probability at least
where X 0 , X 1 , η 1 and I are as above. Therefore, the VIEW of Bob is essentially the same if M δ is replaced by M δ = 1 ⊕ M δ . Hence, in Protocol A, Bob learns essentially nothing about any non-trivial function or relation involving both M 0 and M 1 .
Proof. It is clear that (9) follows from (8). Therefore, Theorem 2 follows from Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we consider a dishonest receiver Bob, and prove Theorem 1. We first note that it suffices to prove the theorem in the case that Bob's recording functions A 0 , A 1 are deterministic. This does not detract from the generality of our results for the following reason. By definition, a randomized algorithm is an algorithm that uses a random help-string r for computing its output. A randomized algorithm A with each fixed help-string r gives rise to a deterministic algorithm A r . Therefore, that Theorem 1 holds for any deterministic recording algorithm implies that for any randomized recording algorithm A, for each fixed help-string r, A using r cannot succeed. Hence, by an averaging argument, A using a randomly chosen r does not help. The reader might notice that the help-string r could be arbitrarily long since Bob has unlimited computing power. In particular, it could be that |r| > B, thereby giving rise to a deterministic recording algorithm with length |A r | = |A| + |r| > B. But our model imposes no restriction on the program size of the recording algorithm. The only restriction is that the length of the output |A r (α)| = B for each r. In the formal model, A is an unbounded non-uniform Turing Machine whose output tape is bounded by B bits.
We prove a slightly stronger result, namely, Theorem 1 holds even if Bob stores not only η 1 , but also η 0 , where η 0 = A 0 (α 0 ) and η 1 = A 1 (η 0 , α 1 ), A 0 , A 1 are Bob's recording functions, and α 0 , α 1 are the public random strings used in Steps 2 and 3 of Protocol A. Let
After η 0 and η 1 are computed in Steps 2 and 3 of Protocol A, the receiver Bob can compute H 0 and H 1 , using unlimited computing power and space. But given 
Thus, consider the case that both H 0 and H 1 are fat. By Lemma 1, for any fat H ⊂ {0, 1} n ,
where B H is defined in (2), i.e. almost all k-subsets of [n] are good for H (See Definition 3 for the definition of goodness). Next, we show that if H is fat, then for a uniformly random A ⊂ [n] s.t. |A| = u, with overwhelming probability, almost all k-subsets of A are good for H.
In other words, for almost all A ⊂ [n] with |A| = u, almost all k-subsets of A are good for any fat H.
Proof. Let U be the set of all the 
Therefore, by (12) and (13),
It follows that there can be at most a 2 −k/6 fraction of u-subsets A such that (14) . The lemma thus follows.
Again let A (0) , A (1) be the random u-subsets of [n] Alice chooses in Step 1 of Protocol A. By (10), Lemma 9 and a union bound, for α 0 , α 1 R ←− {0, 1} n , and uniformly random
Thus consider the case that both B
H1 satisfy (15) . For each c ∈ {0, 1}, denote
. Recall from Definition
H1
.
H0 , and
H1 . Thus by (15), we have
Consider I 0 , I 1 defined in Step 5 of Protocol A. Let ε be the first bit Bob sends Alice in Step 6 of Protocol A. Then by (10), (15) , (16) , and Corollary 4 of Lemma 5 on interactive hashing, for any strategy Bob uses in Steps 4 -6, with probability at least 1 − 2
, and X 1 = s 1 (α 1 ), as defined in Step 7 of Protocol A. Since
H1 , i.e. s 1 is good for H 1 . Note again that given η 0 and η 1 , and thus H 0 and H 1 , all Bob knows about (α 0 , α 1 ) is that (α 0 , α 1 ) is uniformly random in H 0 × H 1 . Since s 1 is good for H 1 , by (1) for the definition of goodness, for α 1
For (α 0 , α 1 ) R ←− H 0 × H 1 , X 0 and X 1 are independent. Thus together with (17), for (α 0 , α 1 ) R ←− H 0 × H 1 , for any b 0 ∈ {0, 1},
Thus, from (18) and all the above, Theorem 1 follows (with β = 1).
Discussion
Building on the work of Cachin, Crépeau, and Marcil [15] , we have given a similar but more efficient protocol for 2 1 -OT in the bounded storage model, and provided a stronger security analysis.
Having proved a stronger result than that of [15] , we note that the model of [15] is slightly stronger than ours in the following sense. In [15] , the dishonest receiver Bob computes an arbitrary function on all public random bits, and stores B bits of output. In our model, α 0 is first broadcast, Bob computes and stores η 0 = A 0 (α 0 ), which is a function of α 0 . Then α 0 disappears. After a short pause, α 1 is broadcast, and Bob computes and stores η 1 = A 1 (η 0 , α 1 ), which is a function of η 0 and α 1 . However, we claim that our model is reasonable, as with limited storage, in practice it is impossible for Bob to compute a function on all of α 0 and α 1 , with |α 0 | = |α 1 | > B, that are broadcast one after another, with a pause in between. Furthermore, we believe that by a more detailed analysis, it is possible to show that our results hold even in the stronger model, where Bob computes an arbitrary function A(α 0 , α 1 ) on all bits of α 0 and α 1 .
As the CCM Protocol, our protocol employs interactive hashing, resulting in an inordinate number of interactions. Further, the communication complexity of the NOVY protocol is quadratic in the size of the string to be transmitted. It thus remains a most important open problem to make this part of the protocol non-interactive and more communication efficient.
Can the storage requirement of our protocol be further improved? For very large n, Ω( √ kn) may not be small enough to be practical. It becomes another important open problem to investigate the feasibility of reducing the storage requirement for OT in the bounded storage model, and establish lower bounds.
